But, there was no mention at all of HMAS Lolita or her commander Herbert Anderson and his crew!
Clearly for Sir Guy Royle, a court martial would expose the failings of the Navy to scrutiny which, at that time, was in the headlines of the Smith’s Weekly newspaper. It appeared any scrutiny was to be avoided. As a result of Royle’s views, Muirhead-Gould merely identified in his 22 June report, that Yarroma did not open fire and this was ‘deplorable and inexplicable’.
However, it should be remembered that Royle expressed his view regarding a DSC at the time Townley was being congratulated for ‘his action’ in sinking M21 in Taylor’s Bay.
And still, Muirhead-Gould continued to incorrectly include Doyle as the commander of Seamist in lieu of Reg Andrew. As for Lolita, Anderson and his crew, there was nothing.
If it was appropriate for Lauriana to be recommended for an award for merely sighting and illuminating a submarine, it was preposterous there was no recommendation for Lolita, despite Anderson, Nelson and Crowe identifying an enemy submarine, reporting the sighting and decisively and determinedly attacking the submarine on three occasions.
There is no mention of Lolita, her crew or of commander Herbert Anderson – not even a pat on the back!
By his reports, Muirhead-Gould had effectively expunged all record of HMAS Lolita, Anderson and his crew from any record of the Battle and recognition of their actions during the Battle of Sydney Harbour. And, the Secretary’s letter, four months after the Battle of Sydney Harbour, still pathetically commended the former commander of Seamist – Doyle, instead of Reg Andrew. To this day, that error has never been corrected and there is no ‘notation’ in Reg Andrew’s service record.
One is therefore left to ask, in the absence of any record in the Minutes of the Naval Board, who authorized the letter to Muirhead-Gould in the name of the Naval Board? Was it merely the personal action of Sir Guy Royle, as the First Naval Member of the Board, and Chief of Navy, and his alone?
Grose refers to the failure to make any awards to the naval personnel, as a ‘monstrous injustice’. One that, he says, is not too late for the Navy and the Government to correct. That opportunity arose, with Brian Anderson’s attempts in seeking recognition for his father’s actions in command of HMAS Lolita.
In dealing with his request, and being the only independent Inquiry since the Battle of Sydney Harbour, the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal said:
The Naval Board decided that nobody should be recognized for their actions on that night despite the recommendation of Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould.
The Tribunal also said:
No reasons were given for that decision and it is not appropriate for this Tribunal to speculate on what those reasons might have been.
And finally, the Tribunal accepted the Naval Board:
… considered the actions taken and decided that in the circumstances of mid-1942 it was not appropriate to recognize any individual act.
Those findings are remarkable, given the absence of any record put into evidence before the Tribunal, confirming that the Naval Board had given consideration to the recognition of actions taken by naval personnel, as distinct from the actions of the Maritime Services Board staff, Cargill and Nangle.
Given there is no evidence of any such consideration by the Naval Board, one is entitled to ask, what evidence was laid before the Tribunal? An examination of the submission by the Department of Defence to the Tribunal, prepared by Dr David Stevens, reveals the only evidence with regard to awards, was the single page report to the Naval Board, for proposed monetary awards to Cargill and Nagle – the Maritime Services Board workers who alerted the Navy. No evidence was presented to the Tribunal, of any report submitted to the Naval Board regarding awards or recognition for naval personnel.
It is also important to note, that at no time during the hearing, did either of the Tribunal members question the lawyers or expert representing the Department of Defence. There were no probing questions to confirm reports had been submitted to the Naval Board, and there was no request to examine the Minutes arising from the meetings of the Naval Board.
As Brian Anderson was seeking a retrospective Award for his father, the Tribunal had a significant obligation to ensure a proper examination of the required matters.
Of importance, the Tribunal found that at the time of the thirteen specific acts that formed the basis of the inquiry, there was no particular prescribed ‘Form’ to be used by commanders when submitting recommendations for recognition. In other words, Muirhead-Gould could set out his recommendations in his own manner, just as he did in his Appendix VI.
In conducting the ‘merits review’, four factors were listed for consideration: that it was no longer possible to provide awards and honours in the Imperial system; that it was possible to make retrospective awards in the Australian system ‘in the most compelling of cases’; new evidence should be assessed by reference to the standards at the time; and similar cases should not be used as a precedent or for comparison.
The Tribunal for the 2011 Inquiry submitted its report to the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence on 21 January 2013 and released the report to the public four weeks later on 18 February 2013. That was over a two months before the Tribunal released the report for the Anderson Appeal. If the members of the Tribunal in the Anderson Appeal had been previously unaware of the outcomes from the 2011 Inquiry, they would certainly have been aware of the significance of the findings for those two months, prior to finalizing and releasing their decision.
As a result of the 2011 Inquiry, the Tribunal in the Anderson Appeal was obligated to; first determine if there had been an ‘injustice’ and ‘maladministration’ in the consideration of awards following the Battle of Sydney Harbour, and secondly, if there had been ‘maladministration’, the Tribunal was obligated to determine if the actions of Herbert Spencer Anderson warranted recognition via an Award.
The Tribunal failed on both accounts.
There was no consideration by the Tribunal to determine if the actions of Muirhead-Gould, Royle, the Naval Board, or the Admiralty, were contaminated by ‘injustice’ or ‘maladministration’. Given the 2011 Inquiry’s finding that a failure by the Naval Board would amount to an ‘injustice’, the Tribunal for Anderson, should have found, the absence of any evidence of any consideration by the Naval Board of Muirhead-Gould’s recommendation for the recognition of naval personnel, amounted to the ‘monstrous injustice’ referred to six years earlier in 2007, by author Peter Grose.
Without the required first determination of ‘injustice’ or ‘maladministration’, the Tribunal was constrained from considering recognition of Anderson’s actions aboard HMAS Lolita.
In making their decision, ‘not to recommend to the Minister that Commissioned Warrant Officer Herbert Spencer Anderson be considered for a defence honour’, without first determining the issue of ‘injustice’ or ‘maladministration’, the Tribunal itself dealt a significant injustice to Herbert Spencer Anderson.
As for the Tribunal’s finding that ‘certain procedures’ were not followed, given there was no prescribed ‘Form’ to be completed, and that a commander merely had to put forward his recommendations as had been done by Muirhead-Gould in his Appendix VI, the Tribunal should have found that all ‘certain procedures’ had in fact been followed.
And it is not as if the Tribunal members for the Anderson Appeal could say they were unaware of the findings from the earlier 2011 Inquiry. Given Tribunal Member Air Commodore Mark Lax in the Anderson Appeal, was also a member of the 2011 Inquiry, he at least, would have been aware of the findings regarding ‘retrospectivity’, ‘maladministration’, ‘injustice’ and ‘certain procedures’. It is therefore even more disturbing these crucial matters were not dealt with by the Tribunal for Herbert Spencer Anderson. It is equally disturbing that neither matter was disclosed to Brian Anderson so he could make relevant submissions, especially as he was not represented by lawyers and was merely advocating for recognition of his father.
Had the Tribunal for Anderson’s Appeal conducted a proper inquiry to satisfy the matters arising from the 2011 Inquiry, it is more than likely, the Tribunal would have exposed the ‘maladministration’ that contaminated the proper consideration of Muirhead-Gould’s recommendations for recognition.
Given the matters raised above including the failures of the Tribunal for Herbert Spencer Anderson, it would be entirely appropriate for Parliament to conduct an Inquiry into the circumstances of the Battle of Sydney Harbour, the recommendations for recognition made at the time, and whether recommendations for appropriate recognition should now be made, to ensure the actions of the officers and men who fought in the Battle are appropriately recognized.
Alternatively, if Parliament has confidence in the Tribunal, the relevant Minister should direct the Tribunal to hold a fresh Inquiry, not only regarding the Anderson Appeal, but a wider Inquiry into the appropriate recognition for all personnel who took part in the Battle of Sydney Harbour.
255 NAA: MP1049/5, 2026/21/79: Midget Submarine Attack on Sydney Harbour., p.44
256 See Footnote 14.
257 NAA: SP338/1, 201/37: (Japanese) Midget Submarine Attack on Sydney Harbour, May 31st June 1st 1942., p.156
258 NAA: SP338/1, 201/37: (Japanese) Midget Submarine Attack on Sydney Harbour, May 31st June 1st 1942., p.154. Date of letter 16 June 1942.
259 The Distinguished Service Order (DSO) is a higher award and was usually made to officers of higher rank. The Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) would be given to a lower rank such as Lieutenant.
260 Captain Darling RANR was loaned to the Royal Navy in 1943 and was appointed commander of HMS Lock Killin on 22 November 1943 to the end of hostilities.
261 See Appendix D - Muirhead-Gould’s Third Report – Appendix VI, ‘Recommendations for Recognition of Personnel’.
262 NAA: A2585, 1942/1945: Naval Board Minutes, 8 July 1942, 6 August 1942, 2 September 1942, 30 September 1942, 8 July 1943, 22 March 1944, 16 May 1944 and 20 September 1944.
263 NAA: A2585, 1942/1945: Naval Board Minutes, 2 September 1942
264 NAA: SP338/1, 201/37: (Japanese) Midget Submarine Attack on Sydney Harbour, May 31st June 1st 1942., p.85
265 Grose, P., A Very Rude Awakening, p.245
266 https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/report-of-the-inquiry-into-unresolved-recognition-for-past-acts-of-naval-and-military-gallantry-and-valour-valour-inquiry/., Published to the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Senator The Hon. David Feeney on 21 March 2013.
267 See p.50 and 51. The Inquiry Report cites a number of NAA Records.
268 See p.5 and 6, Part 8-48, ‘Guidelines for conducting the reviews’
269 https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/report-of-the-inquiry-into-unresolved-recognition-for-past-acts-of-naval-and-military-gallantry-and-valour-valour-inquiry/., Published to the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Senator The Hon. David Feeney on 21 March 2013. See p.8 and 9
270 See Footnote 14.